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DEMURRER TO PARTS OF COMPLAINT
By JOHN D. WELMAN*
"A demurrer is an objection made by one party to his opponent's plead-
ing, alleging, he ought not answer such pleading. . . . A demurrer is
either to the whole or to part of a pleading." (Saunders on Pleading.)
Our code, after abolishing all inconsistent forms of action, by
Sec. 362, Burns 1926, provides that a complaint may be de-
murred to, (1) when the court has no jurisdiction of the defend-
ant or the subject matter; (2) that the plaintiff has no legal
capacity to sue; (3) another action pending between the parties
for the same cause; (4) defect of parties; (5) the complaint
does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action;
(6) that several causes of action have been improperly joined.
Section 367 provides, as did the common law, that a demurrer
will lie to "one or more of the several causes of action alleged in
the complaint, and answer as to the residue."
This article pertains to the use and function of a demurrer
for want of facts when addressed to a part or parts of a com-
plaint. It is suggested on account of its infrequent use, and
because there is an occasional lower court holding that if a
party demurs for one of the above reasons, or upon one ground,
he can not demur upon another; that if he demurs for defect
of parties he can not demur for want of facts; that if he demurs
to the complaint he can not thereafter demur to a part of it,
and vice versa; that if he unsuccessfully demurs for any reason,
there is nothing left except to answer.
Our code provides' that an action is by complaint. This com-
plaint must contain "a statement of the facts constituting the
cause of action, in plain and concise language, without repeti-
tion." The aforesaid sections of our present code (1881) are
identical with that of 1852. The practice acts of 1831 and 1838
and prior thereto preserved in substance the general and special
demurrers of the common law. Such a general demurrer went
only "for defects in substance and excepts to the sufficiency in
general terms, without showing specially the nature of the ob-
jection." The special demurrer was "only for defects in form,
and adds to the terms of a general demurrer a specification of
the particular ground of exception." Our code demurrer took
* Of the Evansville bar.
1 Burns, 1926, Annotated Indiana Statutes, See. 359.
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the place of the common law demurrers. It kept alive the gen-
eral demurrer to the effect that the complaint did not state facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action, but destroyed that func-
tion of the special demurrer in that it might add to the general
demurrer a specification of the particular ground of exceptions.
This condition existed until 1911 when by amendment there was
added the following provision:2
"That when a demurrer to any complaint is filed on the ground that the
complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, a
memorandum shall be filed therewith, stating wherein such pleading is
insufficient for want of facts, and the party so demurring shall be deemed
to have waived his right thereafter to question the same for any defect not
so specified in such memorandum."
This had the practical effect of making our general demurrer
for want of facts a special one limited to the memorandum, and
as such, similar to the second function of common law special
demurrer. Our present demurrer for want of facts is in form
a combination of the general and special, and its function as to
its general averments being limited to the matter stated in the
memorandum. The exception to this restriction is that a court
itself may go outside the memorandum to sustain a demurrer to
a bad complaint. Since 1911 a demurrer to an answer does not
search the record unless the defendant has demurred to the
complaint.3
Whether a complaint states a cause of action may be deter-
mined by a demurrer. The evident purpose of our code is that
there is no need to answer a complaint, or try an issue, that does
not state a cause of action, or would not warrant a judgment by
law upon the facts pleaded and proven. Such policy and prin-
ciple is too elementary for further discussion. But, it must be
that our code provides, by demurrer, that a complaint may be
tested so as to ascertain before proceeding further whether or
not it states a cause of action. As a necessary complement to
that purpose of our code, it must be that a complaint may state
only one cause of action or if otherwise the various parts may
be demurred to. Our highest court from the beginning has uni-
formly held that a complaint, or each paragraph thereof, must
proceed upon a "single and definite theory." Theory is often
2 Burns, 1926, Annotated Indiana Statutes, Sec. 362, cl. 6.
:1 Malone v. Kitchen, 79 Ind. App. 119.
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confused with cause of action. If a complaint contains more
than one cause of action, a motion to paragraph it is proper and
an established procedure of attack.4 If the complaint be in tort,
it is quite common for it to contain numerous averments of dif-
ferent acts or omissions, and each of such acts or omissions
charged as negligence and as the proximate cause of the acci-
dent and injury. If the complaint be for slander, the same con-
dition as to various slanderous words may exist. Let us con-
sider a complaint alleging five different acts causing an injury,
and each act charged to be negligent; each act itself charged as
the cause of the injury. It is well settled that if one of the acts
be a negligent one, the complaint will withstand a demurrer. If
one or more of the four remaining acts do not aver negligence,
how may that matter be determined? If there be doubt as to
whether either of the four remaining acts be actionable negli-
gence, how may that matter be determined before answer or
trial? It is the purpose of our code that a defendant know, if
he desires, whether a complaint states a cause of action, and
this must be as -o all the acts attempted to be averred as action-
able negligence. Our code does not provide that such surplusage,
actionable or otherwise, may remain in a complaint, and to be
taken care of afterward on the trial of the case, or not at all.
If said other four acts are pure surplusage they should be
stricken out upon motion; or if they are not surplusage, there
must be a proper disposal as to their value as constituting a
cause of action, or an additional cause of action.
It is not necessary to cite cases to show that both of our
higher courts have held that a tort action may contain several
separate, independent and distinct acts of negligence averred as
the cause of the injury, and yet proceed upon a single theory.
This situation exists notwithstanding our code says, "Where the
complaint contains more than one cause of action, each shall be
distinctly stated in a separate paragraph and numbered."5 The
reasoning is that the complaint asks but one recovery; that there
is only one injury involved; that the theory of the complaint is
the negligent injury; that it makes no difference whether the
acts of negligence averred are such by statute or common law.
Therefore only one theory is involved, and for a single injury
and a single recovery.
What then can and must be done with a complaint stating five
.acts of negligence and each averred as the cause of the injury?
4 Rich v. Fry, 196 Ind. 303.
Burns, 1926, Annotated Indiana Statutes, Sec. 359, C1. 3.
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If none of said acts of negligence is actionable, then a demurrer
would be sustained to the entire complaint. But if one of the
five is good, then the demurrer to the complaint must be over-
ruled; and because that particular act of negligence makes the
complaint state a "cause of action." A demurrer attacks the
cause of action and not the theory. How then are the other
four, and each of them, to be tested as to their sufficiency to
state a cause of action? Our code provides that pleadings and
issues are settled before the trial, except such as may be amended
thereafter by the parties as provided by the code. The duty of
a court is to try the issues tendered by the pleadings. It in-
structs the jury upon the issues, and has no power to reform
them.
It is evident the complaint will be read to the jury. It may
be taken to the jury room. Evidence will be offered upon all its
five charges of negligence, only one of which has been tested by
demurrer. What of the other four as a matter of pleading?
In some of the lower courts a motion to strike out parts of the
complaint is entertained. Others overrule this motion because
it is not error so to do. This no doubt is proper as to sur-
plusage. It may be that some courts are entertaining such
motion in the nature of a demurrer to delete plural causes of
action, or, those portions of the complaint that independently do
not state a cause of action, and therefore merely encumber the
record as surplusage.
As it was the purpose of the code to test a complaint in its
entirety by demurrer, there must be a proper method as to each
independent charge of negligence. Under Section 367 our courts
have entertained demurrers to parts of complaints as shown by
our reports, and also before its enactment. In Reno v. Tyson,6
which was an action on the breach of a bond, it was held that
although a demurrer will not lie to part of a paragraph of plead-
ing, under the practice at that time, "but regarding each sepa-
rate breach assigned * * * in the light of a separate para-
graph, containing a distinct cause of action, a demurrer may be
properly filed to such breach."
What difference can there be in an action for damages for the
breach of a contract and the breach of any duty imposed by
law? In that case Reno first demurred jointly with his co-
defendants and then demurred separately. If the breach of a
6 24 Ind. 56.
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contract or bond, or its various parts, may constitute distinct
causes of action, may not the negligent breach of various duties
imposed by law create distinct causes of action?
In Colburn v. State,7 an action on a guardian's bond, where
several breaches were assigned, it was held that a demurrer to
the whole complaint should be overruled if one or more of the
breaches be good. It also held that the sufficiency of the breaches
"may be tested by a motion to strike out, or by a separate de-
murrer to each breach."
In Sheetz v. Longlois,s it is said it is not necessary that each
breach of the covenants of a deed be stated in a separate para-
graph in order that each breach may be separately tested by a
demurrer thereto.
These early cases indicate clearly that various causes of action
in the same paragraph may be tested by demurrer, and possibly
by a motion to strike out.
In Jones v. Cullen,9 Cullen sought to enjoin Jones, Treasurer,
from collecting a tax. The complaint contained 11 reasons or
specifications for the illegality of the tax. Each specification
was assailed by a demurrer. It was held proper practice to
demur to each specification. This case followed that of Hill v.
Probst,10 where it was held that the numerous specifications of
the illegality of the tax might be put in one paragraph for con-
venience, and that each specification, when demurred to, is con-
sidered a separate paragraph. This last case likewise is based
upon Hilton v. Mason," which reviewed former cases and said:
"All that is decided by any of them in relation to this question is, that
where the complaint consists of but one paragraph, under our code, a
special demurrer will not lie to a separate allegation, not containing a cause
of action within itself, but the remedy in such cases is by motion to strike
out." (Our italics.)
This last case quotes with approval from Mustard v. Hop-
pess,12 as to the convenience and avoidance of repetition as fol-
lows:
"It seems to us, in analogy to the practice in kindred cases to be soon
noticed, the defendants would have the right to either plead or derur to
7 47 Ind. 310.
8 69 Ind. 491.
9 142 Ind. 336.
10 120 Ind. 528.
1192 Ind. 157.
12 69 Ind. 324.
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each of the specifications, in the same manner as if each had been con-
tained in a separate paragraph of complaint. Thus in action for slander,
where there are different sets of words charged in one paragraph of com-
plaint, the defendant may plead or demur to each set of words * * *.
Under these late and well considered cases, there can be no doubt of this
being the correct practice and within the exceptions noted in Boden v. Dill,
58 Ind. 273."
In Stover v. Harlan,13 the action was to set aside the agree-
ment in a deed. It was held that a demurrer to a certain part
of the complaint "is proper practice, see Section 367 Burns
1926; Jones v. Cullen, 142 Ind. 335; Sheetz v. Longlois, 69 Ind.
491."
This is the first time I have noticed that section of the statute
quoted as an additional authority for demurring to part of a
complaint. Neither have I taken the trouble to find the date of
its enactment. It is in the code of 1852.
In Lovett v. Lovett,14 the action was to enjoin the violation of
a contract. Where a demurrer is presented to complaint as a
whole and only part of it is demurrable, the demurrer should be
overruled. Court said,-"Had a demurrer been addressed to so
much of appellant's complaint as presents this question, it
should have been sustained."
In Flagg v. Russel,'- the action is for damages in an auto-
mobile collision. The complaint charged that appellant negli-
gently swerved his auto from the right to left side of the road
thereby striking appellee's car. Also, that appellant was driv-
ing upon a public highway while intoxicated in violation of Sec-
tion 9 of an act of 1925, page 144. This section makes operat-
ing an auto upon a public highway while intoxicated a misde-
meanor punishable by fine and imprisonment. Appellant moved
to strike out of the complaint so much thereof as charged him
with the violation of this statute. The court overruled this
motion with exception. An answer in denial was filed, trial had
and judgment rendered against appellant. Error was assigned
for the overruling of the motion to strike out the aforesaid part
of the complaint. The court held it was not error to overrule
said notion; that the effect of overruling of said motion was
only to leave surplusage in the complaint. The complaint was
good because it stated common law negligence in negligently
13 87 Ind. App. 34.
14 87 Ind. App. 42.
1. 86 Ind. App. 432.
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swerving from the right to left side of the road. The court
said,-"There was no demurrer to so much of the pleading as
alleged violation of the statute." This is a clear intimation that
appellant might have tested that part of the complaint by de-
murrer, and in an ordinary personal injury case. This disposi-
tion of the motion to strike out shows that such motion does not
have the attributes of a demurrer. There is no reason, statutory
or otherwise, why the rules of pleading in the ordinary tort case
should be different from other actions. It also must be con-
vincing that more than one cause of action (and especially when
numerous) were permitted in one paragraph of complaint as a
matter of convenience and to avoid lengthy repetitions. With
this permission in conflict with the provision in our code (see
359), requiring that each cause of action "shall be distinctly
stated in a separate paragraph and numbered," necessarily came
the permission, as well as the preservation of the right by the
code (Sec. 367), to separately demur to "one or more of the
several causes of action alleged in the complaint." That every
cause of action is subject to a demurrer must be admitted lest
our code and tl~e practice under it be a failure. If that be true,
then every cause of action whether stated separately in one para-
graph, or whether there be two or more in the same paragraph,
must be subject to attack by demurrer. It has become quite
common for complaints for personal injuries to contain numer-
ous acts or omissions as the cause of the injury. They are pur-
posely so pleaded and charged as negligence. It is well settled
that if it requires all the acts, that is a combination of all of
them, to produce the injury, then all such acts must be pleaded
and proven as the cause of action. A failure to prove one would
be a failure to prove the cause of action.', Such acts are said
to be dependent upon one another, or inter-dependent. A de-
murrer to the complaint reaches that condition.
But the most common occurrence is where a complaint, in one
paragraph, contains from two to five acts or omissions charged
as negligence, and with the averment that each of these was the
cause of the injury. These acts may be those of different per-
sons, or occurring at different times, or they-may be different
acts or omissions of the same person. Often the acts have no
relation to each other. Every imaginable thing is put in the
complaint and with the contention of the pleader that the proof
10 See Terre Haute, etc., R. R. Co. v. McCorkle, 140 Ind. 613; Southern
R. R. Co. v. Jones, 33 Ind. App. 333.
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of any one of them will warrant a recovery. It is self-evident
that if proof of one of the acts will warrant a recovery, then
that act alone, in connection with the general averments of the
complaint, states and is a cause of action, and is a separate and
distinct cause of action. The same would be true as to each of
the several acts contained in the complaint.
Authority is not wanting for such pleading, and therefore the
trouble occasioned in the lower courts as to procedure, when in
fact there is ample procedure for the defendant if properly used.
It has been said in substance :17
"In a case where several acts of negligence are sufficiently alleged in
the complaint, a recovery upon the trial will be justified if it be established
that the injury complained of was the result of one or more of said acts."
The invitation for tort pleaders to aver numerous acts as the
cause or causes of the injury, as well as the resulting confusion
comes from the following or kindred expressions :18
"The action pleaded was at common law, and might be predicated upon
as many separate or concurrent acts of negligence as the pleader deemed
operative in producing the injury described. Appellee could have at most,
but one recovery, and, accurately speaking, had but one cause of action,
but had the right of electing to plead it in different forms, and in separate
paragraphs, if the facts were such that the accident might be attributed to
more than one act of negligence. It was his privilege to also include in his
complaint as many acts as he thought in any way contributed toward pro-
ducing the accident without making such complaint amenable to a motion
to separate the same into independent paragraphs."
This and similar expressions have been misconstrued and per-
haps misunderstood. It is conceded that plaintiff's attorney has
the right to file a complaint. He has the "privilege" to write
it as he pleases, upside down if he likes. After all, it must con-
form to the code and rules of pleading as construed or provided
by our Supreme Court. His privilege does not extend beyond
that. In the case just quoted from the complaint might have
been filed in separate paragraphs so that each paragraph con-
tained a single act alleged to be the cause of the accident and
injury. Each paragraph then, if it stated a cause of action,
would state a separate and distinct cause of action, and could
be tested by demurrer thereto. The privilege of putting more
than one act in one paragraph is the privilege heretofore noticed
as one granted for the purpose of convenience and to avoid
37 Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. -v. Barnes, 164 Ind. 143.
IS Knicleerbockcr, etc., Co. v. Gray, 171 Ind. 395.
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repetition of the general averments of the complaint. This
privilege was granted in the face of the provision of the code
that each cause of action should be in a separate paragraph and
numbered. This at most was only a privilege, and as such
could not and did not undertake to destroy any right of the
defendant to question the complaint as provided by our code, or
to demur to parts of the complaint.
Confusion arises because of the expression quoted above,-
"Appellee could have, at most, but one recovery, and accurately
speaking, had but one cause of action," etc. This does not say
that a plaintiff can not, or may not, assert in the same com-
plaint several causes of action, and yet be confined to one re-
covery. This does not say there can not be two or more causes
of action on the same theory. If each paragraph contained a
separate cause of action for the same injury there can be but
one recovery even though a verdict be returned upon all the
paragraphs. The trouble with the lower courts, and it may
reach further, is, that when various independent acts, each
charged as causing the accident, are put into one paragraph it
is concluded that there is but one cause of action pleaded-and
so, because there can be but one recovery. The statement that
appellee had but "one cause of action" and the right to plead it
in "different forms" certainly means that as there could be only
one recovery necessarily this recovery depended upon proof of
one of the several negligent acts charged, or two or more when
so charged. It is the facts averred under the law involved that
constitute the cause of action. A demurrer attacks causes of
action, not theories. "Different forms" as used in the quotation
does not refer to "forms of action." They were abolished by
our code and in lieu thereof a statement of facts provided. The
same quotation suggests the proper pleading-"and in separate
paragraphs, if the facts were such that the accident might be
attributed to more than one act of negligence."
That case and quotation also says:
"It was his privilege also to include in his complaint as many acts as
he thought in any way contributed toward producing the accident, without
making such complaint amenable to a motion to separate the same into
independent paragraphs." (Our italics.)
No doubt such holding was proper because acts that contribute
to the producing of the accident are not the cause of the acci-
dent. They are only a complement to other acts which when
combined produced the accident.
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In Mustard v. Hoppess, 9 heretofore noted, there were 25 dis-
tinct and specific reasons alleged why the tax was illegal. The
defendants had unsuccessfully moved the court to require the
complaint to be paragraphed so that each would state a single
reason. The court said:
"This practice has the merit of convenience, and economy of time and
expense, as it saves the repetition of the whole statement of the levying of
the tax with each specification of objections to it. And, unless the prac-
tice deprives the defendants of some legal right which they would other-
wise have, it should not, in our opinion, be overturned."
This practice based upon convenience and economy did not
deprive the defendant of the right to demur to each specifica-
tion. It seems that practice has obtained, and only on the ground
of convenience and economy. When it arose there was need of
it. In fact, Sec. 359 says the facts should be stated "without
repetition." At present there is doubtful need for such con-
venience and economy. Section 361 (enacted 1917) provides in
substance and in order to prevent repetition the pleader may
subdivide each paragraph into clauses numbered consecutively
and by proper reference and identification incorporate such
clause or clauses into any other paragraph. To read a com-
plaint constructed in this manner is troublesome and perhaps
this is the reason the older practice has continued. Yet it is
plain that the provision of the code requiring each cause of
action to be stated in a separate paragraph and number was
permitted to be violated in the interest of economy and con-
venience, and with the express understanding that it did not
take away the right to demur to each cause of action. This was
merely a privilege, and it took away no right of the other party.
I have not undertaken to note the office of a motion to strike
out, or its function when addressed to such part of a complaint
as contains one of the causes of action in a complaint containing
more than one cause of action. In one of the earlier cases re-
ferred to it was intimated such motion was equivalent to a de-
murrer. It has been said,20 speaking of the general and special
demurrer of the common law (and long before our memorandum
act of 1911) that, "we have no special demurrer. Its place is
occupied by the controlling power of the court to amend, render
more certain, or strike out pleadings, or parts thereof." An
entire pleading may be stricken out for various statutory rea-
19 See supra, note 12.
21 Graham v. Martin, 64 Ind. 567.
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sons but not because it does not state a cause of action. In
Guthrie v. Howland,21 it is held, after reviewing many authori-
ties, such motion can not function as a demurrer for the reason
that if stricken out it can not be amended. Yet in Hart v.
Scott,22 and later cases, it is held that an answer too irrevelant
to be amended may be stricken out. In the most recent case
referred to, Flagg v. Russell,23 it was held that the motion was
properly overruled and left merely surplusage in the complaint,
and which surplusage might have been attacked by demurrer.
The writer has tried to keep pace with the practice in tort
cases where numerous negligent acts or omissions are charged
in one paragraph as the cause of the accident and injury. If
such acts are interpendent and require the combination of all
of them to cause the injury, then a demurrer to the complaint
will test its sufficiency. There may arise a difference of opinion
whether such acts are dependent on each other, or otherwise.
The most common paragraph is one that avers such negligent
act or omission as the cause of the accident, and purposely so
pleaded.
I gather from the best observation I can make from custom
or practice in the lower courts and the decided cases, the follow-
ing procedure:
1. Motion to paragraph, and if overruled-
2. Motion to strike out each part alleging a separate cause
of action, and leaving unattacked one cause of action, the best
one pleaded. Such parts may be surplusage only. If this be
overruled in whole or in part-
3. Demurrer to complaint. If this be overruled-
4. Demurrer to each cause of action in the complaint, set-
ting out separately each cause alleged. If one or more of these
causes of action are well settled as stating a cause of action,
such are omitted and the demurrer is addressed to those which
do not state a cause, and to those that are doubtful.
It does not seem well settled whether the first demurrer should
separately attack each cause of action or the entire complaint.
Such matters little except that the issues be correctly defined.
Proper procedure, as well as the economy of time and expense,
demands that the issues be formed and closed before trial. Evi-
dence is unnecessary before that time, except that the facts
21 164 Ind. 214.
2" Harit v,. Scott, 168 Ind. 530.
23 Supra, note 15.
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pleaded should be known in advance to be in consonance with
the evidence. A court should be deeply interested in the manner
in which the issues of law and fact are made. It may exercise
wise discretion in allowing the withdrawals or the filing of addi-
tional pleadings. To say that an additional answer or other
pleading may not be filed in many instances would be arbitrary.
Perhaps the case most illustrative of the foregoing is Pitts-
burgh, etc., Ry. Co. v. Nichols.24 It certainly must appeal to the
sense and justice of attorneys and courts.
"The defendant has insisted throughout that the first paragraph of
complaint contains five distinct and independent averments of negligence,
on each of which, separately and severally, the plaintiff relies for a re-
covery. On that basis the defendant should have moved for an order to
require the plaintiff to separate the first paragraph into further para-
graphs so as to present but one theory in each paragraph. That would
have been a legitimate method of attack; for, if such a motion had been
sustained and the order complied with, the defendant then could have
tested the sufficiency of each paragraph by demurrer. This brings us to
an interesting subject which requires brief attention.
"The rule has been long established that a complaint should proceed on
a single definite theory; and that is the intention of our Code. Clause 3,
Sec. 343, Burns' Ann. St. 1914. There may be cases where two or more
negligent acts or omissions are so related to or dependent on each other
as that without the concurrence of all of them there would have been no
injury. Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. v. Broderick, 56 Ind. App. 58, 71, 102 N. E.
887; Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. v. McIntosh, 140 Ind. 261, 38 N. E. 476. In
such a case it is proper, of course, to combine the negligent acts and omis-
sions in one paragraph; for then there is but one theory. But, where the
acts or omissions are of such a nature as that any one of them, independ-
ently of the others, might have caused the injury, and the pleader desires
to rely on them separately, each one should be stated in a separate para-
graph. To permit two or more independent acts of negligence to be
averred in the same paragraph of complaint is unfair to the defendant and
confusing and perplexing to the courts. Baltimore, etc., R. Co. V. Tren-
nepohl, 44 Ind. App. 105, 87 N. E. 1059; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Reed,
96 Ind. 195; 1 Watson's Practice, Sec. 331, and authorities there cited;
2 Thornton, Negligence, See. 2333, and authorities there cited."
There is a wide effort to simplify the practice of law and to
expedite or hurry litigation. Unfortunately there are no labor
saving machines or automatic devices whereby a court may do
five times what it formerly did. It is also quite the fashion that
no one should work but few -hours each day. There is probably
about as much just cause for this hue and cry against courts as
there is reason for the present crime wave. It may be disposed
24 78 Ind. App. 361.
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of, if ever, in much the same manner, whatever that may be.
The time was when the overruling of a demurrer to a bad com-
plaint was reversible error. Now it is not error provided the
right result is reached in the trial. How a case may be tried on
a bad complaint and the right result reached is hard to explain,
but it can be and is done. In short, a court reaches that conclu-
sion and finds that result when in fact such court has no author-
ity to weigh the evidence, or, if so, can weigh it for the benefit of
an appellee only. The right result should be carefully guarded.
One of the litigants is trying to avoid it. Our code 25 also pro-
vides the simplest action that can be devised, and without plead-
ings. The parties may submit an agreed statement of facts, in
good faith, signed by the parties, and ask that their rights be
determined. Thereupon the court may render judgment. This
statement, the submission, and judgment of the court is the
entire record. The judgment may be enforced the same as other
judgments. It may be appealed from unless otherwise agreed in
the submission. It is needless to state why this method is not
used. Yet that agreed case, or statement of facts under the law
applicable must show a cause of action in favor of one of the
parties. A cause of action, and not its theory, is the foundation
for every recovery. Our code does not mention theory. Liti-
gants want a fight, and will not stand for the aforesaid simple
practice whereby one of them is stipulated out of court. They
prefer that a jury or court construe or misconstrue the evidence.
It is not reversible error to overrule a motion to strike out
parts of a complaint. Such holding is based upon the reason that
the evidence to prove such part may be objected to at the trial
and error predicated at that time if it be inadmissible. Why
wait until that time, and broadcast it to a jury with the increased
expenses of a trial and the probable effect upon the jury?
It is not reversible error to overrule a motion to paragraph
.a complaint although the motion is well taken. Misj9inder of
causes of action, and especially the motion to require the several
paragraphs of complaint to be docketed as independent actions
improperly joined, are matters largely within the sound discre-
tion of the court. This condition creates a greater necessity that
parts of a complaint be tested by demurrer. Good pleading sim-
plifies issues and expedites trials.
2, Burns, 1926, Annotated Indiana Statutes, Sec. 604.
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